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recently by the Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Former
Yugoslavia in Prosecutor v. Tadid.4
It is a serious historical error to argue that customary laws of war reflected in the
Hague Conventions apply only to "international wars" between states and not also to
civil war upon recognition of insurgents as "belligerents," as in the case of the U.S. Civil
War. Lieber's codification was meant to apply to a belligerency but also to reflect law
applicable in wars between states. Previously, and thereafter, laws of war were also ap-
plicable in wars with Indian nations. Violations in each instance have long been
recognized as "war crimes."
If you have felt a sense of history and dared to participate, perhaps the efforts and
determination of Professor Francis Lieber will be an inspiration. They have for
many others.
EuHU ROOT AND CRISIS PREVENTION
by Mary Ellen O'Connell*
Elihu Root pursued two themes relevant to international law and crisis. He believed
firmly in the value of arbitration and adjudication to prevent crisis. He also worked
toward the codification and greater specificity of international law so thatjudges and
arbitrators would have more law available to apply in aid of crisis prevention. When
crisis had not been prevented, as in the case of World War I, Root did not in fact believe
international law-either process or substance-had much to offer. In his view, the
Kaiser started World War I because he was bent on hegemony. Arbitration would not
stop him, only the use of armed force. Root, therefore, supported early U.S. entry into
the war. Once the war ended, he fully supported the establishment of a world court to
prevent the next war.
It is only natural that Root supported international adjudication and the rule of law
for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. Before becoming secretary ofwar
under McKinley and secretary of state under Roosevelt, Root had spent 1865-1899
practicing law in NewYork City. He had defended Boss Tweed and the Sugar Trust. The
law is what Root knew, and it appealed to his nature. Root was highly intelligent, logical,
articulate (often quite witty), conservative, and a realist.1 He knew law was used to settle
disputes between the U.S. states; he thought it should work among fully sovereign
states, too.
The fact that Root was a lawyer explains a good deal about him-the shape of the
choices he made and why he succeeded with many of those choices. But the fact that
he was a lawyer is not the whole story. Many with legal training have keen, analytic
minds. Fewer have shared his commitment to the rule of law in international relations.
But quite special to Root was his lack ofself-seeking. Keeping the country out of trouble-
that was his ambition. "'The main object of diplomacy,' wrote Root on September 9,
1905, is 'to keep the country out of trouble.' Accordingly, he avoided unnecessary
drama and stimulated crises. His legal career had trained him to conciliate, not antago-
nize, to seek reasonable solutions, not spectacular triumphs."2
'Para. 63 (Aug. 10, 1995).
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He thought enhancing the role of lawwas a reasonable solution. His lack of personal
ambition made it possible for powerful individuals like McKinley, Theodore Roosevelt,
and Taft to trust him. People believed he truly had the best interest of the country in
mind in his search for peace through the law he so revered. As a result, he was trusted
to put forth novel ideas, like the resolution of international disputes through com-
pulsory adjudication. He could make his proposals for a world court at the Second
Hague Peace Conference and at the Central American Peace Conference. (He won the
Nobel Peace Prize for his work toward peace in Central America.) He negotiated twenty-
four arbitration treaties, which he actually got through the Senate. He established the
International Joint Commission with Canada. He could propose arbitration with
Canada to solve the long-standing dispute over fishing off Newfoundland. He was
invited in 1920 to help draft the Statute of the Permanent Court of InternationalJustice
(PCIJ) and again in 1929 to revise the Statute. He was allowed to take the long view,
and he was willing to do so because he was not promoting his own record.'
He never gained the trust or respect of Woodrow Wilson, however. Wilson did not
trust, respect, or like Elihu Root. In many ways the men were opposites and, at the time
of the crisis of World War I, that fact can only be regretted. Root was notoriously
excluded from the American delegation to the Paris peace negotiations. As a result, he
did not leave his mark on the central institution for dispute resolution of his era: the
League of Nations. A historian of American foreign policy, Richard W. Leopold, ex-
plains Wilson's reasons for excluding Root: "Actually, Wilson's motives were simple if
not commendable. He was temperamentally unable to work closelywith men ofstature,
and he avoided coadjutors he could not dominate. Root would have been too strong
an associate, no matter what his beliefs were."4 Jessup adds that Wilson disliked lawyers
and that he wanted no outstanding Republicans in the delegation.5 Wilson also thought,
probably unfairly, that Root had done a miserablejob in the summer of 1917 when he
sent him to Russia. His mission had been to keep Russia in the war.
Even more important, however, Root had a different vision from Wilson for the post-
war world. Leopold believes that if Root had been included, he would have been more
amenable to Wilson's ideas and the ultimate shape of the League would have been more
realistic, and most important, the United States might well have joined. We can never
know if Root's inclusion in the delegation would have made the fundamental difference.
The media expressed the view in 1919 that Root would go to Paris,6 and his naming
had been expected in Republican circles. "[Ojf all Republicans, he was best equipped
to deal with foreign statesmen. His prestige as former secretary of state, asjudge on the
Hague Court, and as recipient of the Nobel Prize, his success in charming Latin
America in 1906, and his ingenuity in drafting a world court plan in 1907, all stamped
him as an obvious choice." 7 Colonel House had solicited from Root ideas for a post-war
world organization. Moreover, Root had been a senator and retained close friendships
and influence in the Senate. But "[a] s for Root's potential influence in winning over
the Senate, Wilson, to his sorrow, forgot that entirely."'
On the other side of the argument, Root could not bring himself to support import-
ant aspects of Wilson's plan. Root did not support the use of force to enforce peaceful
settlement. Root recognized and advocated the view that preservation of the peace is
an interest of the whole international community.9 But Root felt that this part of
3JEssuP, supra note 2, at 50.
4 LEoPoLD, supra note 1, at 132-33.
5JEssUP, supra note 2, at 480; see also DUNNE, supra note 1, at 21.
6JESSUP, supra note 2, at 379.
7 LEOPOLD, supra note 1, at 131.
8 1 d. at 133.
9JESUp, supra note 2, at 377.
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Wilson's plan was too ambitious and that the United States would not be able to honor
the commitments required of it.'° He felt strongly that the United States could not sup-
port what emerged as Article X of the Covenant-the commitment "to respect and
preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and exiting political
independence of all members of the League." Root felt Wilson was promoting this and
other ideas with his own legacy in mind, as opposed to what would actually work and
what the American people could accept."
Root preferred a world court as the centerpiece of the post-war order, with a looser
conference of states meeting regularly to work out disputes through conciliation. 2
Commenting in 1926, he stressed the essential difference between the work of a con-
ference, which deals with particular situations, and the work of a court, which decides
cases but in doing so continually builds up "a body of agreement which narrows the
field of controversy between nations and prevents future controversies." 3
During the Paris peace talks, Root had written an open letter suggesting amendments
to the first draft of the covenant released in February 1919.14 His suggestions were largely
ignored. He wrote in June to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, a close friend, complaining
that nothing had been done "to provide for the reestablishment and strengthening of
a system of arbitration or judicial decision upon questions of legal right" or "for the
revision or development of international law," leaving "a program which rests the hope
of the whole world for future peace in a government of men, and not of laws, following
the dictates of expediency, and not of right." 5 Root advised the Senate to pass a
resolution requesting that the president negotiate with the other powers for the strength-
ening of a system of international arbitration and for periodical meetings of govern-
ments to revise and develop international law.'6
In the end, Root favored U.S. membership in Wilson's League but only on the condi-
tion that the United States make major reservations, especially regarding Article X. He
did not work strenuously for ratification, however, nor did he exercise influence over
Lodge. The Senate failed to ratify the Covenant even with Root's reservations. Writing
in 1937, Jessup concluded that Root had been right.17 The world was not ready for a
binding commitment to use force to maintain the peace. But if the United States had
been in the League, working to adjust unfair aspects of the Treaty of Versailles, would
force have been necessary?
Naturally, Root was an enthusiastic supporter of the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice. In 1920, he was invited by the League of Nations to serve with ten
other distinguished international jurists to draft the Statute of the PCIJ. Root and his
British colleague Lord Philimore were responsible for the method of selectingjudges,
something Root had early identified as a key problem for the success of international
adjudication. His method remains substantially the same one used today for the selec-
tion of International Court ofJusticejudges. Root also played a key role in determining
the PCU's jurisdiction. Ro6t always felt strongly that when states seek out judicial or
arbitral settlement, they want an outcome based on law and not on the personal views
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